Hearsay - Entries in Official Records

The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer.

Exhibit “A,” or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence (People of the Philippines Vs. Rosario "Rose" Ochoa, G.R. No. 173792. August 31, 2011).

Effect of Separation from Service

As we held in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., separation from the service renders a former employee out of the reach of the government’s administrative processes with respect to the former employment, but this claim does not hold true if the separation from the service was in contemplation of and to escape administrative liability from an offense that took place and was investigated while the employee was still in the service (Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Jesus Vincent M. Carbon III, formerly Clerk III, RTC, Zamboanga City, A.M. No. P-10-2836. September 28, 2011).

Pre-trial Order

It is true that the issues to be tried between the parties in a case shall be limited to those defined in the pre-trial order.

However, a pre-trial order is not intended to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be taken during the trial, for it is unavoidable that there are issues that are impliedly included among those listed or that may be inferable from those listed by necessary implication which are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those expressly listed.

At any rate, it remains that the petitioner impleaded Cuevas and Saddul as defendants, and adduced against them evidence to prove their liabilities. With Cuevas and Saddul being parties to be affected by the judgment, it was only appropriate for the RTC to inquire into and determine their liability for the purpose of arriving at a complete determination of the suit. Thereby, the RTC acted in conformity with the avowed reason for which the courts are organized, which was to put an end to controversies, to decide the questions submitted by the litigants, and to settle the rights and obligations of the parties (Philippine Export and Foreign Load Guarantee Corporation (now Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines) Vs. Amalgamated Management and Development Corporation, et al.,
G.R. No. 177729. September 28, 2011).

Theories on Appeal

To begin, although the defenses of unenforceability, ratification and preterition were raised by the Heirs of Alfonso for the first time on appeal, they are concomitant matters which may be taken up. As long as the questioned items bear relevance and close relation to those specifically raised, the interest of justice would dictate that they, too, must be considered and resolved. The rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should refer to independent, not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action (Hiers of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al./Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al., G.R. No. 165748/G.R. No. 165930. September 14, 2011).

Hearsay

It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue (Hiers of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al./Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al., G.R. No. 165748/G.R. No. 165930. September 14, 2011).

Second MR

UE further contends that the Court in resolving the issue on the second MR should not be too dogmatic in its ruling. It persuades the Court to adopt a complete and holistic view, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the case as well as the provisions on the liberal interpretation of the rules and the inherent power of the NLRC to amend and reverse its findings and conclusions as may be necessary to render justice.

Indeed, a second MR as a rule, is generally a prohibited pleading. The Court, however, does not discount instances when it may authorize the suspension of the rules of procedure so as to allow the resolution of a second motion for reconsideration, in cases of extraordinarily persuasive reasons such as when the decision is a patent nullity (University of the East Vs. University of the East Employees' Association, G.R. No. 179593. September 14, 2011).

Separation Pay

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to separation pay. Although by way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity (Nissan Motors Phils., Inc. Vs. Victorino Angelo, G.R. No. 164181. September 14, 2011).

Knowledge of Import of Contract

Unless a contracting party cannot read or does not understand the language in which the agreement was written, he is presumed to know the import of his contract and is bound thereby (Swift Foods, Inc. Vs. Spouses Jose Mateo, Jr. and Irene Mateo, G.R. No. 170486. September 12, 2011).

Non-Owner Seller

The general principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer a better title than he has.

Moreover, the owner of the goods who has been unlawfully deprived of it may recover it even from a purchaser in good faith.

The exception from the general principle is the doctrine of estoppel where the owner of the goods is precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell. But in order that there may be estoppel, the owner must, by word or conduct, have caused or allowed it to appear that title or authority to sell is with the seller and the buyer must have been misled to his damage (Antonio Francisco, substituted by his heirs, Nelia E.S. Francisco, et al. Vs. Chemical Bulk Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 193577. September 7, 2011).

Annotation of Levy

Similarly, in Pacific Commercial Co. v. Geaga, the Court held that although the Register of Deeds may properly reject an attachment where it appears that the titles involved are not registered in the name of the defendants (debtors), that rule yields to a case where there is evidence submitted to indicate that the defendants have present or future interests in the property covered by said titles, regardless of whether they still stand in the names of other persons. The fact that the present interests of the defendants are still indeterminate, and even though there was no judicial declaration of heirship yet, is of no consequence for the purpose of registering the attachment in question. This is the case since what is being attached and what may be later sold at public auction in pursuance of the attachment cannot be anything more than whatever rights, titles, interests and participations which the defendants may or might have in the property so attached. In other words, if they had actually nothing in the property, then nothing is affected and the property will remain intact. This rule is expressed in Section 35, Rule 39 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure (Spouses Anselmo and Priscilla Bulaong Vs. Veronica Gonzales, G.R. No. 156318. September 5, 2011)

Effect of Notarization

As notarized documents, Deeds of Absolute Sale carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.

In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Notary Public signed his name as one of the two witnesses to the execution of the said deed; hence, there was actually only one witness thereto. Moreover, the residence certificate of petitioner was issued to petitioner and then it was given to the Notary Public the day after the execution of the deed of sale and notarization; hence, the number of petitioner’s residence certificate and the date of issuance (June 21, 1966) thereof was written on the Deed of Absolute Sale by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966, after the execution and notarization of the said deed on June 20, 1966. Considering the defect in the notarization, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 cannot be considered a public document, but only a private document, and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on preponderance of evidence (Adelaida Meneses (deceased), substituted by her heir Marilyn M. Carbonel-Garcia Vs. Rosario G. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196. October 19, 2011).

Liability of Employer to Seaman's Death

The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act (Maritime Factors Inc. Vs. Bienvenido R. Hindang, G.R. No. 151993. October 19, 2011).

Penalty of Dishonesty

Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service.

However, in several administrative cases, the Court refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. There were several cases, particularly involving dishonesty, in which the Court meted a penalty lower than dismissal because of the existence of mitigating circumstances (Falsification of Daily Time Records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, A.M. No. P-10-2784. October 19, 2011).

Three Readings on Separate Days

Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment (Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271).

Anonymous Complaint

Rule II – Disciplinary Cases

SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.

No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person complained of may be required to comment.

Burden of Proof

Even where the petitioner alleged non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the respondent to prove payment, rather than on the petitioner to prove non-payment (Keppel v. Adao, G.R. No.158227, October 19, 2005).

Void Contract

Notwithstanding these irregularities, it should be pointed out that there is no novelty regarding the question of satisfying a claim for construction contracts entered into by the government, where there was no appropriation and where the contracts were considered void due to technical reasons.

Although this Court agrees with respondent’s postulation that the “implied contracts”, which covered the additional constructions, are void, in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules and lack of legal requirements, we nonetheless find the instant petition laden with merit and uphold, in the interest of substantial justice, petitioners-contractors’ right to be compensated for the "additional constructions" on the public works housing project, applying the principle of quantum meruit (DPWH v. Quiwa, G.R. No. 183444, October 12, 2011).

Allegation of Aggravating Circumstance / Exemplary Damages

The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAA’s relationship to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded where the circumstances of the case show the “highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender (People v. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011)

Liberal Construction of the Rules

Firstly, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' Position Paper and the affidavits of its witnesses should not have been considered by the trial courts since these were filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period required under Section 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Petitioners do not dispute the appellate court's finding that they submitted their position paper and affidavits more than three months after the deadline set by the abovementioned rules.

As noted by the CA, petitioners did not even bother to file a motion asking the trial court to admit their position paper which was belatedly filed. Indeed, the record is barren of any evidence to show that petitioners, at least, tried to offer any explanation or justification for such delay. They simply ignored the Rules. This Court has previously held that technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that, while the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business (Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159328, October 5, 2011)

Attorney's Fees

Further, the court should state the reason for the award of attorney’s fees in the body of the decision. Its unheralded appearance in the dispositive portion is, as a rule, not allowed.

Here, however, although the RTC did not specifically discuss in the body of its decision its basis for awarding attorney’s fees, its findings of fact clearly support such an award. For instance, the RTC found, based on the record, that Bongar persistently and clearly violated the terms of its contract with Alcatel. It failed to finish the works by October 29, 1991, the stipulated date. It sought on December 1, 1991, more than a month after it was in violation, to finish its job by May 31, 1992, an extra seven months for just a three-month project. Worse, when Alcatel had to take over the job to save its own undertaking to PLDT, Bongar refused to return to Alcatel the uninstalled materials that it provided for the works. Alcatel was forced to litigate to protect its interest (Alcatel v. Bongar, G.R. No. 182946, October 5, 2011)