Saturday, December 10, 2011

Hearsay - Entries in Official Records

The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer.

Exhibit “A,” or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence (People of the Philippines Vs. Rosario "Rose" Ochoa, G.R. No. 173792. August 31, 2011).

Friday, December 9, 2011

Effect of Separation from Service

As we held in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., separation from the service renders a former employee out of the reach of the government’s administrative processes with respect to the former employment, but this claim does not hold true if the separation from the service was in contemplation of and to escape administrative liability from an offense that took place and was investigated while the employee was still in the service (Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Jesus Vincent M. Carbon III, formerly Clerk III, RTC, Zamboanga City, A.M. No. P-10-2836. September 28, 2011).

Pre-trial Order

It is true that the issues to be tried between the parties in a case shall be limited to those defined in the pre-trial order.

However, a pre-trial order is not intended to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be taken during the trial, for it is unavoidable that there are issues that are impliedly included among those listed or that may be inferable from those listed by necessary implication which are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those expressly listed.

At any rate, it remains that the petitioner impleaded Cuevas and Saddul as defendants, and adduced against them evidence to prove their liabilities. With Cuevas and Saddul being parties to be affected by the judgment, it was only appropriate for the RTC to inquire into and determine their liability for the purpose of arriving at a complete determination of the suit. Thereby, the RTC acted in conformity with the avowed reason for which the courts are organized, which was to put an end to controversies, to decide the questions submitted by the litigants, and to settle the rights and obligations of the parties (Philippine Export and Foreign Load Guarantee Corporation (now Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines) Vs. Amalgamated Management and Development Corporation, et al.,
G.R. No. 177729. September 28, 2011
).

Monday, November 28, 2011

Theories on Appeal

To begin, although the defenses of unenforceability, ratification and preterition were raised by the Heirs of Alfonso for the first time on appeal, they are concomitant matters which may be taken up. As long as the questioned items bear relevance and close relation to those specifically raised, the interest of justice would dictate that they, too, must be considered and resolved. The rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should refer to independent, not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action (Hiers of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al./Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al., G.R. No. 165748/G.R. No. 165930. September 14, 2011).

Hearsay

It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue (Hiers of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al./Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, namely: Teresa F. Ureta, et al. Vs. Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr., namely: Conrado B. Ureta, et al., G.R. No. 165748/G.R. No. 165930. September 14, 2011).

Sunday, November 27, 2011

Second MR

UE further contends that the Court in resolving the issue on the second MR should not be too dogmatic in its ruling. It persuades the Court to adopt a complete and holistic view, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the case as well as the provisions on the liberal interpretation of the rules and the inherent power of the NLRC to amend and reverse its findings and conclusions as may be necessary to render justice.

Indeed, a second MR as a rule, is generally a prohibited pleading. The Court, however, does not discount instances when it may authorize the suspension of the rules of procedure so as to allow the resolution of a second motion for reconsideration, in cases of extraordinarily persuasive reasons such as when the decision is a patent nullity (University of the East Vs. University of the East Employees' Association, G.R. No. 179593. September 14, 2011).

Separation Pay

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to separation pay. Although by way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity (Nissan Motors Phils., Inc. Vs. Victorino Angelo, G.R. No. 164181. September 14, 2011).