Vested Rights in Procedural Rules

The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them (Gemma P. Cabalit Vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit Vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. Vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342. January 17, 2011).

Jurisdiction - Forcible Entry

Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or improperly laid. There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner's objection became a pure technicality (Georgia T. Estel Vs. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., namely, Recaredo Jr., Roline, Ramel, Rhoel, and Ruby, all surnamed Diego, G.R. No. 174082. January 16, 2011).

Effect of Presumption of Negligence

Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages (Albert Tison and Claudio L. Jabon Vs. Sps. Gregorio Pomasin and Consorcia Ponce Pomasin, et al., G.R. No. 173180. August 24, 2011).

Notice of Hearing

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that private respondents complied with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said motion contains the required notice of hearing. The specific date and time of the hearing of the motion was left by the respondents to the discretion of the court. We believe, and so hold, that private respondents substantially complied with the provisions of the Rules of Court regarding litigated motions. What is important is that petitioners were properly apprised that such motion was filed by private respondents. The obligation to notify them when the hearing on the motion would be heard rests on the trial court (The Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Calderon-Bargas, G.R. No. 147939, July 6, 2007).

All Risk Policy

The marine open policy that Seaboard issued to New World was an all-risk policy. Such a policy insured against all causes of conceivable loss or damage except when otherwise excluded or when the loss or damage was due to fraud or intentional misconduct committed by the insured. The policy covered all losses during the voyage whether or not arising from a marine peril (New World International Development (Phils.), Inc. Vs. Nyk-FilJapan Shipping Corp., et al./New World International Development(Phils.), Inc. Vs. Seaboard-Eastern Insurance Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 171468/ G.R. No. 174241. August 24, 2011).

Period to Appeal

This Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify their petition’s dismissal.

In this case, the last day for filing the petition for review was on September 13, 2006. The petitioners entrusted the drafting of their petition with their counsel, who in turn entrusted the attaching of the required annexes to the petition with her secretary. The secretary resigned from her job sometime later to avoid giving her employer “problems for unexpected absences in the future.” Aside from this, the petitioners also submitted an Affidavit from the secretary, who narrated her ordeal that day and why she was not able to inform her employer of the whereabouts of the petition. A certification from the doctor of one of the secretary’s children was also submitted to prove that the secretary indeed brought her children to the doctor on September 14, 2006, the deadline for filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals (Heirs of Rodolfo Crisostomo, (Euprocinia Crisostomo, et al.) Vs. Rudex International Development Corporation, G.R. No. 176129. August 24, 2011).

Notice of Hearing

In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed a liberal application of technical rules of procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the importance of the subject matter of the controversy.

It was not refuted that petitioner furnished respondent and respondent actually received copies of the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner. As a result, respondent was able to file its Oppositions to the said Motions. The RTC, in issuing its Order dated December 7, 2000, was able to consider the arguments presented by both sides. Hence, there was substantial compliance by petitioner with the rules on notice of hearing for its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000. Respondent cannot claim that it was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on its opposition to said Motions (City of Dumaguete, herein represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices Vs. Philippines Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973. August 24, 2011).