Allegation of Elements of Crime in Information

Thus, while it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the crime in the information, the failure to do so is not an irremediable vice. When the complaint or the resolution by the public prosecutor which contain the missing averments is attached to the information and form part of the records, the defect in the latter is effectively cured, and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that his right to be informed is violated (Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 25, 2005).

Presumption of Forgery

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), represeted by Rosella A. santiago Vs. Antonio O. Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780. January 25, 2012).

Interlocutory Order of COMELEC Division

Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed (Douglas R. Cagas Vs. the Commission on Elections & Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24, 2012).

Piercing Doctrine

For the piercing doctrine to apply, it is of no consequence if Sceptre is a sole proprietorship. As ruled in Prince Transport, Inc., et al. v. Garcia, et al., it is the act of hiding behind the separate and distinct personalities of juridical entities to perpetuate fraud, commit illegal acts, evade one’s obligations that the equitable piercing doctrine was formulated to address and prevent (Timoteo H. Sarona Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Roayle Security Agency, et al., G.R. No. 185280. January 18, 2012).

Vested Rights in Procedural Rules

The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them (Gemma P. Cabalit Vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit Vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. Vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342. January 17, 2011).

Jurisdiction - Forcible Entry

Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or improperly laid. There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner's objection became a pure technicality (Georgia T. Estel Vs. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., namely, Recaredo Jr., Roline, Ramel, Rhoel, and Ruby, all surnamed Diego, G.R. No. 174082. January 16, 2011).

Effect of Presumption of Negligence

Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages (Albert Tison and Claudio L. Jabon Vs. Sps. Gregorio Pomasin and Consorcia Ponce Pomasin, et al., G.R. No. 173180. August 24, 2011).