Corporate Power to Sue

The general rule is that where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. Nonetheless, an individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in interest. (Yu v. Yukayguan, G.R. No. 177549, June 18, 2009)

Reglementary Period

As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby. (Guasch v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 176015, June 16, 2009)

Incomplete Testimony

Petitioner contends that because her direct examination has not been completed and as she has not been cross-examined, her testimony has become useless. Apparently, petitioner is alluding to the rule that oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party; until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. The rule will not apply to the instant case.

Private respondent, who was present in court during the August 20, 2003 hearing and did not register any objection to the trial court's order nor move to strike out petitioner's testimony from the records, is deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine petitioner. Thus, petitioner's testimony is not rendered worthless. The waiver will not expunge the testimony of petitioner off the records. The trial court will still weigh the evidence presented by petitioner vis-à-vis that of private respondent's. (De Castro v. De Castro, G.R. No. 172198, June 16, 2009)

Res Judicata

There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. (People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)

Effect of Forum Shopping

Ordinarily, a dismissal on the ground of forum shopping dispenses with the need to address the other issues raised in the case. But this rule is not hard-and-fast, more so since the dismissal occasioned by breach of the anti-forum shopping rule does not permeate the merits of the case. Where such technical dismissal would otherwise lead to an inequitable result, the appropriate recourse is to resolve the issue concerned on its merit or resort to the principles of equity. After all, rules of procedure should not operate at all times in such a rigid way that would override the ends of substantial justice. Specifically, the rule on forum shopping was cobbled to foster and accelerate the orderly administration of justice and, therefore, should not be interpreted literally in every instance. (Tagaro v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173931, April 2, 2009)

State Immunity from Estoppel

Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, we have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use. One would assume that if respondents were correct, they would have adduced the factual or legal basis for their contention, such as the local government’s land use plan or zoning ordinance that would indicate that the property was not commercial. Respondents did not do so, and the absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong. (Newsounds v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009)

Appeal of Pure Question of Law

Rule 43 provides for an instance where an appellate review solely on a question of law may be sought in the CA instead of the Supreme Court. (Santos v. Committee on Claims Settlement, G.R. No. 158071, April 2, 2009)

Period to File Disqualification Cases before HRET

However, the said ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification cases based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding. (Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178831-32, April 1, 2009)

Joint Adoption by Spouses

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Lim, G.R. No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009)

Immutability of Final Judgments

Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment. (Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156687-88, May 21, 2009)

It is true that notwithstanding the principle of immutability of final judgments, equity still accords some recourse to a party adversely affected by a final and executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to annul the judgment based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. He may also have a competent court stay the execution or prevent the enforcement of a final judgment when facts and circumstances that render execution inequitable or unjust meanwhile transpire; or when a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief (Angelina Pahila-Garrido Vs. Elisa M. Tortogo, et al., G.R. No. 156358. August 17, 2011).

Privileged Communication

We note that the publications or articles in question are neither private communications nor true reports of official proceedings without any comments or remarks. However, this does not necessarily mean that the questioned articles are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. (Villanueva v. PDI, G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009)

Certiorari even if Appeal Available

It must be remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. The Court has not too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations would warrant such a recourse. Moreover, the Court allowed a Rule 65 petition, despite the availability of plain, speedy or adequate remedy, in view of the importance of the issues raised therein. The rules were also relaxed by the Court after considering the public interest involved in the case; when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; when the broader interest of justice so requires; when the writs issued are null and void; or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. (People's Broadcasting v. Secretary of DOLE, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)

Cash or Surety Bond for Perfecting an Appeal

Thus, in some cases, the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards had been relaxed, such as when (i) there was substantial compliance with the Rules; (ii) the surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious ground to reduce the bond; (iii) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits; or (iv) the appellants, at the very least exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.

The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed. The Deed of Assignment in the instant case, like a cash or surety bond, serves the same purpose. First, the Deed of Assignment constitutes not just a partial amount, but rather the entire award in the appealed Order. Second, it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount is under the full control of the bank, and not of petitioner, and is in fact payable to the DOLE Regional Office, to be withdrawn by the same office after it had issued a writ of execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of Assignment in tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. Third, the Court finds that the execution of the Deed of Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made in good faith, and constituted clear manifestation of petitioner’s willingness to pay the judgment amount. (People's Broadcasting v. Secretary of DOLE, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)

Presumption of Regularity

The courts below heavily relied on the testimony of PO3 Tougan and in the same breadth, banked on the presumption of regularity. In People v. Garcia, we said that the presumption only arises in the absence of contrary details in the case that raise doubt on the regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedures prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption. (People v. Partoza, G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009)

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties likewise stands in this case. Said presumption was not overcome, as there was no evidence showing that the two police officers were impelled by improper motive. (Quinicot v. People, G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009)

Obligation to Issue Ex Parte Writ of Possession

The obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. (DBP v. PNA, G.R. No. 175728, May 8, 2009)

Relationship between Bank and Depositor

Generally, the relationship between a credit card provider and its card holders is that of creditor-debtor, with the card company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the card holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the creditor. This relationship already takes exception to the general rule that as between a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the depositor is considered as the creditor. (Pantaleon v. American Express, G.R. No. 174269, May 8, 2009)

Constructive Delivery

However, the execution of a public instrument only gives rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment. It is necessary that the vendor shall have control over the thing sold that, at the moment of sale, its material delivery could have been made. Thus, a person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument. (APT v. T. J. Enterprises, G.R. No. 167195, May 8, 2009)

Right of Contingent Creditor to Access Records of Intestate Proceedings

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all “interested parties” the petitioners as “interested parties” will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners. (Hilado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009)

Five-Year Period to Execute thru Motion

Respondent’s motion for execution was filed only on June 14, 2005, or six years and nine months from entry of judgment. It was clearly beyond the five-year period but within the ten-year prescriptive period. We have, at various occasions, allowed a mere motion for execution even if filed beyond the five-year period, for reasons of equity. We apply the same liberality in this case in view of the peculiar situation in this case. (PVB v. Solid Homes, G.R. No. 170126, June 9, 2009)

Effect of Certiorari on Prescriptive Period

Despite being an original certiorari proceeding, G.R. No. 138993 tolled the running of the prescriptive period. An analysis of its peculiar nature justifies taking it out of the ambit of the rule that certiorari proceedings do not toll the running of the prescriptive period. (PVB v. Solid Homes, G.R. No. 170126, June 9, 2009)

Habitual and Gross Negligence as Ground for Dismissal

Gross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

Although Mateo’s infraction was not habitual, we must take into account the substantial amount lost. In this case, LBC lost a motorcycle with a book value of P46,000 which by any means could not be considered a trivial amount. Mateo was entrusted with a great responsibility to take care of and protect company property and his gross negligence should not allow him to walk away from that incident as if nothing happened and, worse, to be rewarded with backwages to boot. (LBC v. Mateo, G.R. No. 168215, June 9, 2009)

Motion for Extension to File Motion for Reconsideration

Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed.

This rule, however, is not absolute and admits of exceptions based on a liberal reading of the rule.

In opting for the liberal application of the rules in the interest of equity and justice, the Court held that we “cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all.”

We feel, too, that the petitioner can neither be faulted nor punished for the NPO’s act of releasing the April 3, 1995 issue early; it was a matter wholly outside the petitioner’s control given that this is a decision wholly for NPO to make. (Imperial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158093, June 5, 2009)

Change of Theory on Appeal

The People contends that accused-appellant should not be allowed to change his theory on appeal. We do not agree. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole action for review on any question including those not raised by the parties (People vs. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996); People vs. Godines, 196 SCRA 765 [1991]; People vs. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 [1993]; see also Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]). The reason for this rule is that every circumstance in favor of the accused should be considered (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). (People v. Yam-Id, G.R. No. 126116, June 21, 1999).

As a rule, a change of theory cannot be allowed. However, when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the Court may give due course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein (Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009).

Grounds for Termination of Employment

Essentially, the Labor Code of the Philippines has several provisions under which an employee may be validly terminated, namely: (1) just causes under Article 282; (2) authorized causes under Article 283; (3) termination due to disease under Article 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Article 285. While the said provisions did not mention as ground the enforcement of the Union Security Clause in the CBA, the dismissal from employment based on the same is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. (Inguillo v. First Phil. Scales, G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009)

In Del Monte Philippines, the stipulations in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since a CBA is the law between the company and the Union, and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor.

Negligence of Counsel

It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.

In People of the Philippines and Bricio Ygana v. Rafael Bitanga, an exception to the foregoing rule is enunciated, and that is when the negligence of counsel had been so egregious that it prejudiced his client's interest and denied him his day in court. For this exception to apply, however, the gross negligence of counsel should not be accompanied by his client's own negligence or malice. Clients have the duty to be vigilant of their interests by keeping themselves up to date on the status of their case. (Pascual v. People, G.R. No. 162286, June 5, 2009)

It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client.  A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. The only exception would be, where the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law. In this case, there was no such deprivation of due process. Respondent was able to fully present and argue her case before the Labor Arbiter.  She was accorded the opportunity to be heard.  Her failure to appeal the Labor Arbiter's Decision cannot, therefore, be deemed as a deprivation of her right to due process (Building Care Corporation / Leopard Security & Investigation Agency and/or Ruperto Protacio Vs. Myrna Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357. December 5, 2012).

In Pari Delicto

Thus, we declared that even assuming both parties were guilty of the violation, it does not always follow that both parties, being in pari delicto, should be left where they are. We recognized as an exception a situation when courts must interfere and grant relief to one of the parties because public policy requires their intervention, even if it will result in a benefit derived by a plaintiff who is in equal guilt with defendant. (Villegas v. Rural Bank of Tanjay, G.R. No. 161407, June 5, 2009)

Release of Surety in Case of Change in Contract

Indeed, a surety is released from its obligation when there is a material alteration of the principal contract in connection with which the bond is given, such as a change which imposes a new obligation on the promising party, or which takes away some obligation already imposed, or one which changes the legal effect of the original contract and not merely its form. However, a surety is not released by a change in the contract, which does not have the effect of making its obligation more onerous. (Stronghold v. Tokyu, G.R. No. 158820-21, June 5, 2009)

Who May Claim Insurance Proceeds

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured. (Maramag v. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009)

Hypothetical Admission

The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.

However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if:

1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2. such allegations are legally impossible;
3. the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case. (Maramag v. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009)

Waiver of Claim if not in Answer

As we explained in Banco de Oro Universal Bank v. CA, a party is not barred from setting up a claim even after the filing of the answer if the claim did not exist or had not matured at the time said party filed its answer. (TRB v. Cuison, G.R. No. 174286, June 5, 2009)

Appeal from Judgment of Acquittal

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense. (People v. de Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009)

The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication(Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. Vs. Sally Go Bangayan/Resally De Asis Delfin Vs. Sally Go Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777/G.R. No. 172792. October 19, 2011).

Absence of Accused at the Trial

Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. (People v. de Grano,G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009)

Seizure of Property

Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. (Rivera v. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, June 5, 2009)

Legality of ULP Strike

Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore, where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be groundless. (HEPI v. SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN, G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009)

Review of Factual Issue under Rule 45

Notably, the errors cited by petitioners are factual in nature. Although the instant case is a petition for review under Rule 45 which, as a general rule, is limited to reviewing errors of law, findings of fact being conclusive as a matter of general principle, however, considering the conflict between the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals , there is a need to review the factual issues as an exception to the general rule. (Producers v. Excelsa, G.R. No. 152071, May 8, 2009)

We apply the cardinal rule that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on such findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 179090, June 5,2009)

Private Practice

Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department allows government employees to engage directly in the private practice of their profession provided there is a written permission from the Department head. (Abella v. Cruzabra, A.C. No. 5688, June 4, 2009)

Liability of Corporate Officers in Dismissal of Employees

The general manager of a corporation should not be made personally answerable for the payment of an illegally dismissed employee's monetary claims arising from the dismissal unless he had acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating the services of the employee. (M+W Zander v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 169173, June 5, 2009)

Filing of Motion for Reconsideration in Certiorari

We find that respondents’ non-filing of a motion for reconsideration is justifiable under the circumstances of this case. It is not disputed that the trial court, rightly or wrongly, considered them to have voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by virtue of their motion for inhibition. Thus, respondents’ apprehension that the motion for reconsideration might be construed as further manifesting their voluntary appearance is certainly well-grounded. They may not, therefore, be faulted for having resorted immediately to a special civil action for certiorari. (PCIB v. Pi, G.R. No. 171137, June 5, 2009).

The general rule is that before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner is mandated to comply with a condition precedent: the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order, which motion is denied. The rule, however, is subject to the following recognized exceptions:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. ( Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135703, April 15, 2009)

Reliance on Title

Furthermore, under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine the legal status of the property, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.

“Furthermore, he testified that he undertook great care in verifying the clean title of the said land, [e.g.,] deputizing an employee to do the necessary research, personally copying pertinent documents registered in the Registry of Property and even consulting legal advice on the matter. These, for Us, are badges of good faith.” (MCIAA v. Tirol, G.R. No. 171535, June 5, 2009)

The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and hence does not merit the protection of the law.

In this case, when the subject properties were sold to Catalino Torre and subsequently to Doronila, respondent Jose was not in possession of the said properties. Such fact should have put the vendees on guard and should have inquired on the interest of the respondent Jose regarding the subject properties (Yared v. Tiongco, G.R. No. 161360. October 19, 2011).

Effect of Judgment on Appeal

We have always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the reversal of the judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists, however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the parties appealing are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception which is based on a communality of interest of said parties is recognized in this jurisdiction. (Dadizon v. Bernadas, G.R. No. 172367, June 5, 2009).

Parole Evidence

The parol evidence rule, as relied on by the RTC to decide in favor of Lynn Maagad, proscribes any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written agreement by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions. Thus, among other grounds, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading a mistake in the written agreement. For the mistake to validly constitute an exception to the parol evidence rule, the following elements must concur: (1) the mistake should be of fact; (2) the mistake should be mutual or common to both parties to the instrument; and (3) the mistake should be alleged and proved by clear and convincing evidence. (Maagad v. Maagad, G.R. No. 171762, June 5, 2009)