Private Counsel for LGU

It can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority.  On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by the people’s money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense.  On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice.  In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in the discharge of governmental functions, ‘municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof.

In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel.  In one case, We held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper.  And in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when “the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity (Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, G.R. No. 108232, August 23, 1993).

Late Appellant's Brief

Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.

In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant’s brief on petitioner’s part. When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its appellant’s brief, there was a clear intention on the part of petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it not for its counsel’s act of inadvertently misplacing the Notice to File Brief in another file,  petitioner could have seasonably filed its appellant’s brief as its counsel had already prepared the same even way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.

Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory negligence in the dismissal of its appeal. Hence, the ensuing dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to the gross negligence of its counsel. For said reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice. Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence (CMTC International Marketing Corporation Vs. Bhagis International Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 170488. December 10, 2012).

Liability of Directors

Settled is the rule that debts incurred by directors, officers, and employees acting as corporate agents are not their direct liability but of the corporation they represent, except if  they contractually agree/stipulate or assume to be personally liable for the corporation’s debts, as in this case (Ildefonso S. Crisologo Vs. People of the Philippines and China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 199481. December 3, 2012).

Review by SC of Factual Findings

The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court. Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases where we, in the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction, may  be urged to look into factual issues raised in a Rule 45 petition. For instance, when the petitioner persuasively alleges that there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support the factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo (Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. Vs. Salvadors T. Serna, G.R. No. 172086. December 3, 2012).

Pari Delicto

The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to.  Here [De Los Santos] desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but  because the subject of the transaction is a  piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy  on which our homestead law is predicated.  This right cannot be waived. “It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve”. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that [De Los Santos] can maintain the present action it  being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law [De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94 Phil. 405 (1954)].

Appeal of Criminal Case by Offended Party

The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine. 

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case (Dante LA. Jimenez, etc. Vs. Hon. Edwin Sorongon, etc., et al., G.R. No. 178607. December 5, 2012).

Custody of the Law for Adjudication of Reliefs

As  a  rule,  one  who  seeks  an  affirmative  relief  is  deemed  to  have submitted  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  Filing pleadings seeking affirmative  relief  constitutes  voluntary  appearance,  and  the  consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus,  by  filing several motions before the RTC seeking the  dismissal of  the  criminal  case,  respondent  Alamil  voluntarily  submitted  to  the jurisdiction  of  the  RTC.  Custody of the law  is  not  required  for  the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail (Dante LA. Jimenez, etc. Vs. Hon. Edwin Sorongon, etc., et al., G.R. No. 178607. December 5, 2012).

Effect of Reversal of Judgment

This Court has always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the reversal of the judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists, however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception, which is based on a communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this jurisdiction. In the instant case, the rights and liabilities of Solid Builders and PNB Republic are, no doubt, intertwined and inseparable. The enforcement of the rights of Solid Builders under the contract it entered into with PNB Republic is completely dependent upon the latter's performance of its obligations thereunder. Assuming that Solid Builders' offer to purchase the disputed properties is subsequently proven to be superior to that of First Leverage, PNB Republic shall be required to proceed with its contract to sell the subject properties to Solid Builders. Thus, to allow the execution of the RTC judgment, by requiring PNB Republic to sell the questioned lots to First Leverage, without first determining with finality whether the latter's offer to buy the disputed properties is indeed superior to Solid Builders' offer would not only result in the deprivation of Solid Builders' right to due process but, more importantly, an unwarranted defeat or forfeiture of its substantive rights (First Leverage and Services Group, Inc. Vs. Solid Builders, Inc, G.R. No. 155680. July 2, 2012).

Reinstatement

Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. However, if reinstatement would only exacerbate the tension and strained relations between the parties, or where the relationship between the employer and the employee has been unduly strained by reason of their irreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in the company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement (Bank of Lubao, Inc. Vs. Rommel J. Manabat, et al., G.R. No. 188722. February 1, 2012).

Appeal - Certiorari

In the present case, the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint against respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings against respondent but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves two defendants, Intermodal and herein respondent and the complaint against Intermodal is still pending. Thus, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari availed of by petitioner before the CA was proper and the CA erred in dismissing the petition (D.M. Ferrer & Associates Corporation Vs. University of Santo Tomas, G.R. No. 189496. February 1, 2012).

Appeal from Acquittal

The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;  or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.  (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al., G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.  In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any “procedural unfairness or irregularity” that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that “all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites,” and that “the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity.” He even argues that “Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned.” (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Liability Extinguished by Death of Accused

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term “personal penalties” refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term “pecuniary penalties” (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,  including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).  However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Hearsay - Entries in Official Records

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information.      

Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately proved (Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. Vs. Rodelio Alberto and Enrico Alberto Reyes, G.R. No. 194320. February 1, 2012).

Inconsistency in Testimony

The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro, these being relatively trivial and insignificant, neither pertaining to the act constitutive of the crime committed nor to the identity of the assailant.  (People of the Philippines Vs. Vicente Vilbar @ "Dikit",  G.R. No. 186541. February 1, 2012).

Injunction

Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the NEA Board may have long been implemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well be repeated by other government agencies in the reorganization of their offices. Petitioners have not lost their remedy of injunction (United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. Vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107. January 31, 2012).

Notice of Hearing

Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the above requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon.  The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.

The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. 

As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion for execution executed as a matter of right without the needed notice and hearing requirement to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse party (Douglas F. Anama Vs. Court of Appeals, Philippine Savings Bank, Spouses Saturnina Baria & Tomas Co and the Register of Deeds, Metro Manila, District II,
G.R. No. 187021. January 25, 2012).

Allegation of Elements of Crime in Information

Thus, while it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the crime in the information, the failure to do so is not an irremediable vice. When the complaint or the resolution by the public prosecutor which contain the missing averments is attached to the information and form part of the records, the defect in the latter is effectively cured, and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that his right to be informed is violated (Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 25, 2005).

Presumption of Forgery

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), represeted by Rosella A. santiago Vs. Antonio O. Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780. January 25, 2012).

Interlocutory Order of COMELEC Division

Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed (Douglas R. Cagas Vs. the Commission on Elections & Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24, 2012).