Pari Delicto

The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to.  Here [De Los Santos] desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but  because the subject of the transaction is a  piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation. This is the policy  on which our homestead law is predicated.  This right cannot be waived. “It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve”. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that [De Los Santos] can maintain the present action it  being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead law [De los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, 94 Phil. 405 (1954)].

Appeal of Criminal Case by Offended Party

The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine. 

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case (Dante LA. Jimenez, etc. Vs. Hon. Edwin Sorongon, etc., et al., G.R. No. 178607. December 5, 2012).

Custody of the Law for Adjudication of Reliefs

As  a  rule,  one  who  seeks  an  affirmative  relief  is  deemed  to  have submitted  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  Filing pleadings seeking affirmative  relief  constitutes  voluntary  appearance,  and  the  consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus,  by  filing several motions before the RTC seeking the  dismissal of  the  criminal  case,  respondent  Alamil  voluntarily  submitted  to  the jurisdiction  of  the  RTC.  Custody of the law  is  not  required  for  the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail (Dante LA. Jimenez, etc. Vs. Hon. Edwin Sorongon, etc., et al., G.R. No. 178607. December 5, 2012).

Effect of Reversal of Judgment

This Court has always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the reversal of the judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists, however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception, which is based on a communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this jurisdiction. In the instant case, the rights and liabilities of Solid Builders and PNB Republic are, no doubt, intertwined and inseparable. The enforcement of the rights of Solid Builders under the contract it entered into with PNB Republic is completely dependent upon the latter's performance of its obligations thereunder. Assuming that Solid Builders' offer to purchase the disputed properties is subsequently proven to be superior to that of First Leverage, PNB Republic shall be required to proceed with its contract to sell the subject properties to Solid Builders. Thus, to allow the execution of the RTC judgment, by requiring PNB Republic to sell the questioned lots to First Leverage, without first determining with finality whether the latter's offer to buy the disputed properties is indeed superior to Solid Builders' offer would not only result in the deprivation of Solid Builders' right to due process but, more importantly, an unwarranted defeat or forfeiture of its substantive rights (First Leverage and Services Group, Inc. Vs. Solid Builders, Inc, G.R. No. 155680. July 2, 2012).

Reinstatement

Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. However, if reinstatement would only exacerbate the tension and strained relations between the parties, or where the relationship between the employer and the employee has been unduly strained by reason of their irreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in the company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement (Bank of Lubao, Inc. Vs. Rommel J. Manabat, et al., G.R. No. 188722. February 1, 2012).

Appeal - Certiorari

In the present case, the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint against respondent is a final order because it terminates the proceedings against respondent but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves two defendants, Intermodal and herein respondent and the complaint against Intermodal is still pending. Thus, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari availed of by petitioner before the CA was proper and the CA erred in dismissing the petition (D.M. Ferrer & Associates Corporation Vs. University of Santo Tomas, G.R. No. 189496. February 1, 2012).

Appeal from Acquittal

The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;  or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.  (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al., G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.  In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any “procedural unfairness or irregularity” that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that “all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites,” and that “the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity.” He even argues that “Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned.” (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Liability Extinguished by Death of Accused

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term “personal penalties” refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term “pecuniary penalties” (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,  including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).  However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action (Artemio Villareal Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon Vs. People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa Vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al.,
G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080. February 1, 2012)

Hearsay - Entries in Official Records

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information.      

Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately proved (Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. Vs. Rodelio Alberto and Enrico Alberto Reyes, G.R. No. 194320. February 1, 2012).

Inconsistency in Testimony

The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro, these being relatively trivial and insignificant, neither pertaining to the act constitutive of the crime committed nor to the identity of the assailant.  (People of the Philippines Vs. Vicente Vilbar @ "Dikit",  G.R. No. 186541. February 1, 2012).

Injunction

Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the NEA Board may have long been implemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well be repeated by other government agencies in the reorganization of their offices. Petitioners have not lost their remedy of injunction (United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. Vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107. January 31, 2012).

Notice of Hearing

Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the above requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon.  The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.

The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. 

As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion for execution executed as a matter of right without the needed notice and hearing requirement to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse party (Douglas F. Anama Vs. Court of Appeals, Philippine Savings Bank, Spouses Saturnina Baria & Tomas Co and the Register of Deeds, Metro Manila, District II,
G.R. No. 187021. January 25, 2012).

Allegation of Elements of Crime in Information

Thus, while it is necessary to allege the essential elements of the crime in the information, the failure to do so is not an irremediable vice. When the complaint or the resolution by the public prosecutor which contain the missing averments is attached to the information and form part of the records, the defect in the latter is effectively cured, and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that his right to be informed is violated (Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 25, 2005).

Presumption of Forgery

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), represeted by Rosella A. santiago Vs. Antonio O. Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780. January 25, 2012).

Interlocutory Order of COMELEC Division

Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed (Douglas R. Cagas Vs. the Commission on Elections & Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24, 2012).

Piercing Doctrine

For the piercing doctrine to apply, it is of no consequence if Sceptre is a sole proprietorship. As ruled in Prince Transport, Inc., et al. v. Garcia, et al., it is the act of hiding behind the separate and distinct personalities of juridical entities to perpetuate fraud, commit illegal acts, evade one’s obligations that the equitable piercing doctrine was formulated to address and prevent (Timoteo H. Sarona Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Roayle Security Agency, et al., G.R. No. 185280. January 18, 2012).

Vested Rights in Procedural Rules

The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them (Gemma P. Cabalit Vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit Vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. Vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342. January 17, 2011).

Jurisdiction - Forcible Entry

Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or improperly laid. There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner's objection became a pure technicality (Georgia T. Estel Vs. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., namely, Recaredo Jr., Roline, Ramel, Rhoel, and Ruby, all surnamed Diego, G.R. No. 174082. January 16, 2011).

Effect of Presumption of Negligence

Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages (Albert Tison and Claudio L. Jabon Vs. Sps. Gregorio Pomasin and Consorcia Ponce Pomasin, et al., G.R. No. 173180. August 24, 2011).

Notice of Hearing

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that private respondents complied with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said motion contains the required notice of hearing. The specific date and time of the hearing of the motion was left by the respondents to the discretion of the court. We believe, and so hold, that private respondents substantially complied with the provisions of the Rules of Court regarding litigated motions. What is important is that petitioners were properly apprised that such motion was filed by private respondents. The obligation to notify them when the hearing on the motion would be heard rests on the trial court (The Heirs of Dela Rosa v. Calderon-Bargas, G.R. No. 147939, July 6, 2007).

All Risk Policy

The marine open policy that Seaboard issued to New World was an all-risk policy. Such a policy insured against all causes of conceivable loss or damage except when otherwise excluded or when the loss or damage was due to fraud or intentional misconduct committed by the insured. The policy covered all losses during the voyage whether or not arising from a marine peril (New World International Development (Phils.), Inc. Vs. Nyk-FilJapan Shipping Corp., et al./New World International Development(Phils.), Inc. Vs. Seaboard-Eastern Insurance Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 171468/ G.R. No. 174241. August 24, 2011).

Period to Appeal

This Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify their petition’s dismissal.

In this case, the last day for filing the petition for review was on September 13, 2006. The petitioners entrusted the drafting of their petition with their counsel, who in turn entrusted the attaching of the required annexes to the petition with her secretary. The secretary resigned from her job sometime later to avoid giving her employer “problems for unexpected absences in the future.” Aside from this, the petitioners also submitted an Affidavit from the secretary, who narrated her ordeal that day and why she was not able to inform her employer of the whereabouts of the petition. A certification from the doctor of one of the secretary’s children was also submitted to prove that the secretary indeed brought her children to the doctor on September 14, 2006, the deadline for filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals (Heirs of Rodolfo Crisostomo, (Euprocinia Crisostomo, et al.) Vs. Rudex International Development Corporation, G.R. No. 176129. August 24, 2011).

Notice of Hearing

In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed a liberal application of technical rules of procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the importance of the subject matter of the controversy.

It was not refuted that petitioner furnished respondent and respondent actually received copies of the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner. As a result, respondent was able to file its Oppositions to the said Motions. The RTC, in issuing its Order dated December 7, 2000, was able to consider the arguments presented by both sides. Hence, there was substantial compliance by petitioner with the rules on notice of hearing for its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000. Respondent cannot claim that it was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on its opposition to said Motions (City of Dumaguete, herein represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices Vs. Philippines Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973. August 24, 2011).

Explanation of Service

Counsel for petitioner holds office in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, in the Visayas; while counsel for respondent holds office in Quezon City, Metro Manila, in Luzon. Given the considerable distance between the offices of these two counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other was clearly not practicable and a written explanation as to why personal service was not done would only be superfluous (City of Dumaguete, herein represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices Vs. Philippines Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973. August 24, 2011).

Collateral Attack Against Judgment

Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that “a collateral attack against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals.” (Renald F. Vilando Vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011).

Res Judicata

It is true that res judicata is to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality (Spouses Nelson and Myra Villanueva
Vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 163433. August 22, 2011)

Indeed, we have held that res judicata is to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality, particularly in this case where there was actually no determination of the substantive issues in the first case and what is at stake is respondents’ home (Philippine National Bank v.The Intestate Estate of Francisco de Guzman , G.R. No. 182507, June 16, 2010).

In American jurisdiction, it is recognized that “(i)nstances in which dismissals are not considered to be on the merits for purposes of the application of the doctrine of res judicata include … dismissal based on court’s procedural inability to consider a case.” (Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr., et al. Vs. Amparo Robles Cabreza, G.R. No. 181962. January 16, 2011).

Service of Summons

In the case at bench, when Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for Reconsideration of the April 8, 2003 Decision of the RTC, and Petition for Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot. In Palma v. Galvez, this Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that “the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.” (Atiko Trnas, Inc., et al. Vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 167545. August 17, 2011).

Laches

On the other hand, laches, being rooted in equity, is not always to be applied strictly in a way that would obliterate an otherwise valid claim especially between blood relatives. The existence of a confidential relationship based upon consanguinity is an important circumstance for consideration; hence, the doctrine is not to be applied mechanically as between near relatives (Estate of Margarita D. Cabacungan, represented by Luz Laigo-Ali Vs. Marilou Laigo, et al., G.R. No. 175073. August 15, 2011).

Appeal Period to NLRC

Time and again, however, this Court, considering the substantial merits of the case, has relaxed this rule on, and excused the late posting of, the appeal bond when there are strong and compelling reasons for the liberality, such as the prevention of miscarriage of justice extant in the case or the special circumstances in the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved. After all, technical rules cannot prevent courts from exercising their duties to determine and settle, equitably and completely, the rights and obligations of the parties. This is one case where the exception to the general rule lies.

While respondents had failed to post their bond within the 10-day period provided above, it is evident, on the other hand, that petitioners are NOT employees of respondents, since their relationship fails to pass muster the four-fold test of employment (Marticio Semblante and Dubrick Pilar Vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 196426. August 15, 2011).

Res Inter Alios Acta

In as much as Bokingco’s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy (People of the Philippines Vs. Michael Bokingo and Reynante Col, G.R. No. 187536. August 10, 2011)

Certification Election

The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process of certification election, since this is the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other. The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively (San Miguel Foods, Inc. Vs. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union, G.R. No. 146206. August 1, 2011)

Fallo

The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail (ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 131656. October 12, 1998).