Liability in Robbery with Homicide

When a homicide takes place by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether or not they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that they had endeavored to prevent the killing. (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 187152, July 22, 2009)

Effect of Sale on Easement

From the foregoing, it can be inferred that when the owner of two properties alienates one of them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates, entitlement to it continues, unless there is a contrary agreement, or the indication that the easement exists is removed before the execution of the deed. (PMO v. Legaspi Towers, G.R. No. 147957, July 22, 2009)

Non-Compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165

A close examination of the IRR of RA 9165 readily reveals that the custodial chain rule admits of exceptions. Thus, contrary to the brazen assertions of Cortez, the prescriptions of the IRR’s Sec. 21 need not be followed with pedantic rigor as a condition sine qua non for a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not, by itself, render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” (People vs. Cortez, G.R. No. 183819, July 23, 2009)

Need for Consent of Spouse in Sale of Conjugal Property under the Civil Code

So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. (De Leon v. de Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009)

Effect of Appeal to Other Accused

Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. (People v. Olivo, G.R. No. 177768, July 27, 2009)

Absence in Pre-trial

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions, non-appearance by the plaintiff in the pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the action. However, every rule is not without an exception. In fact, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides that the non-appearance of a party may be excused if a valid cause is shown therefor. (Anson v. Pacific Banking, G.R. No. 179999, March 17, 2009)

Mandamus to Compel Action Only

It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, 156 SCRA 222, 232 [1987]).

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for. (Angchangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728. February 13, 1997)

No MR Against Comelec En Banc Resolution

The filing of his Motion for Reconsideration is of no moment. Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure categorically prohibits a motion to reconsider a resolution of the COMELEC en banc except in cases involving election offenses. (Valino v. Vergara, G.R. No. 180492, March 13, 2009)

No Determination of Heirship in Ordinary Civil Action

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs.

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. (Heirs of Gabatan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009)

Review of Errors

The Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. (Heirs of Gabatan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009)

Corporate Authority to Mortgage

A private corporation, by way of exceptions, may give a third party mortgage:

1. When the mortgage of corporate assets/properties shall be done in the furtherance of the interest of the corporation and in the usual and regular course of its business; and
2. To secure the debt of a subsidiary. (Zomer v. IEB, G.R. No. 150694, March 13, 2009)

Effectivity of Contract

Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. (Unisource v. Chung, G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009)

Acquittal Not Extinguish Civil Liability

Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009)

Authority to Act for Corporation

In People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that under Section 23, the power and the responsibility to decide whether the corporation should enter into a contract that will bind the corporation are lodged in the board of directors, subject to the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or relevant provisions of law. However, just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts for and on his behalf, the board of directors may validly delegate some of its functions and powers to officers, committees or agents. The authority of such individuals to bind the corporation is generally derived from law, corporate by-laws or authorization from the board, either expressly or impliedly by habit, custom or acquiescence in the general course of business. (Cebu v. Tsukahara, G.R. No. 159624, July 17, 2009)

Relief without Application

In Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison, we held that the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally. The petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in form is not fatal. Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, this Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor. (Fletcher v. Director of Bureau of Corrections, UDK-14071, July 17, 2009)

Collegial Body Must Act through Members

We also see no irregularity in the fact that the Order dated August 1, 2007 was signed only by the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division. He acted within the authority vested in him by Section 6, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. (Panlilio v. Comelec, G.R. No. 181478. July 15, 2009)

Review of DOJ Resolution

Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. (Aduan v. Chong, G.R. No. 172796. July 13, 2009)

Visitorial and Enforcement Power of DOLE

This notwithstanding, the power of the Regional Director to hear and decide the monetary claims of employees is not absolute. The last sentence of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the “exception clause,” provides an instance when the Regional Director or his representatives may be divested of jurisdiction over a labor standards case.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, the so-called “exception clause” has the following elements, all of which must concur:

1. that the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon;
2. that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and
3. that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. (Meteoro v. Creative Creatures, G.R. No. 171275, July 13, 2009)

Judgment in Ejectment Binding only on Parties

A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam. x x x Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. However, this rule admits of the exception, such that even a non-party may be bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. (Salandanan v. Mendez, G.R. No. 160280, March 13, 2009)

Indefeasibility of Title

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership does not apply where the very certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin. (GAUF v. RTC, G.R. No. 139672, March 4, 2009)

Backwages for Illegal Dismissal

He never bothered to redeem his license at the soonest possible time when there was no showing that he was unlawfully prevented by respondent from doing so. Thus, petitioner should not be paid for the time he was not working. The Court has held that where the failure of employees to work was not due to the employer's fault, the burden of economic loss suffered by the employees should not be shifted to the employer. Each party must bear his own loss. It would be unfair to allow petitioner to recover something he has not earned and could not have earned, since he could not discharge his work as a driver without his driver's license. Respondent should be exempted from the burden of paying backwages.

The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or management and employee, of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining employees' wages. If there is no work performed by the employee, there can be no wage or pay -- unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed, or otherwise illegally prevented from working, a situation which we find is not present in the instant case.

Conjugal Partnership Not Liable for Personal Obligation

To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. (Buado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009)

Execution

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, viz: (a).where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision’s ratio decidendi; and (b).where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision. (Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 183278. April 24, 2009)

Motion Rule

For the most part, the Comelec was well within its authority to order a re-hearing, it having the inherent power to amend or control its processes and orders before these become final and executory. It can even proceed to issue an order motu proprio to reconsider, recall or set aside an earlier resolution which is still under its control. (Marcoleta v. Comelec, G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009)

Hearsay Rule

The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. The witness who testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same, as this is a matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is to prove either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof. (People v. Malibiran, G.R. No. 178301, April 24, 2009)

Dismissal of Appeal for Failure to File Brief

Section 8 is clear — the Court of Appeals may, motu proprio and with notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. (Polintan v. People, G.R. No. 161827)

Dismissal with Consent No Double Jeopardy

As a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009)

Weight Given to Factual Findings of Trial Court

The rule on the weight to be given to the findings of the trial court does not unqualifiedly apply, when the judge who rendered the decision did not hear the principal evidence of the prosecution. For in such, case, his evaluation of the evidence is based on the transcript of stenographic notes, which also forms the basis for the Court of Appeals to review the trial court’s decision and render its own decision. (People v. Cawaling, G.R. No. 157147, April 17, 2009)

Hearsay Rule

It is a hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the witness stand. Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of Anita appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. (Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009)

Dismissal of Employee

We agree with both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that Atty. Garcia’s ouster as Vice-President, who is a corporate officer of ETPI, partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate controversy, jurisdiction over which is vested in the SEC (now the RTC). The Labor Arbiter thus erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case filed by Atty. Garcia, because he had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. (Garcia v. ETPI, G.R. No. 173115, April 16, 2009)

Person Liable for Violation of Anti-Graft Law

Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. However, if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which is “to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.” (Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 16, 2009)

Demolition

If under Rep. Act No. 7279, demolition and eviction are allowed when individuals have been identified as professional squatters and squatting syndicates or when they occupy danger areas and other public places, and under P.D. No. 1096, they construct dangerous and ruinous buildings or structures, then with more reason the SPFMPCI members should be summarily evicted and their structures and dwellings demolished. The parcel of land involved in this case is a security zone whose operations must be protected from any form of disruption. It must be protected from all types of squatters, including the SPFMPCI members, who might create danger to a very important national telecommunications facility. (Republic v. Mijares, G.R. No. 1706-15-16, July 9, 2009)

No Need to Appeal Decision of Secretary to OP

As a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

Furthermore, DAR-AO No. 7, s. 1997 requires an appeal (of the denial of application of conversion) to the OP. It was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy contemplated by Section 1 of Rule 65.

Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an administrative official should first appeal to the higher administrative authority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case, the complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action. (Manubay v. Garilao, G.R. No. 140717, April 16, 2009)

Practice or Custom

A practice or custom is, as a general rule, not a source of a legally demandable or enforceable right. Indeed, in labor cases, benefits which were voluntarily given by the employer, and which have ripened into company practice, are considered as rights that cannot be diminished by the employer. Nevertheless, even in such cases, the source of the employees’ right is not custom, but ultimately, the law, since Article 100 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits elimination or diminution of benefits. (Makati Stock Exchange v. Campos, G.R. No. 138814, April 16, 2009)

Void Contract

The general rule that the direct result of a previous void contract cannot be valid will not apply in this case as it will directly contravene the Torrens system of registration. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, this Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. (Rabaja vs. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, G.R. No. 177181, July 7, 2009)

Attorney's Fees Chargeable to Union Funds

Hence, the general rule is that attorney’s fees, negotiation fees, and other similar charges may only be collected from union funds, not from the amounts that pertain to individual union members. As an exception to the general rule, special assessments or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon or checked off from any amount due an employee for as long as there is proper authorization by the employee. (Marino v. Gamilla, G.R. No. 149763, July 7, 2009)

Authority to Use Government Vehicle

The use of government motor vehicles by the bureaus and offices enumerated under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 733 for the purpose herein indicated shall be authorized only through the issuance of each trip ticket, duly signed by the Chief or Administrative Officer of the bureau, office or entity concerned….

Except in emergency cases, under no circumstance should government motor vehicles be used without the corresponding trip ticket having been duly issued by the official designated for the purpose. In case of use of said vehicles without such trip tickets, the official to whom the vehicle is assigned, his driver and other passengers shall be personally liable for the unauthorized use thereof. (Re: Unauthorized Disposal of Unnecessary and Scrap Materials in the Supreme Court Baguio Compound, A.M. No. 2007-17-SC, July 7, 2009)

Separate Civil Action

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. (Cheng v. G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009)

Execution of Final Judgment

Execution of a final judgment or order may be stayed or precluded under any of the following conditions:

1. Equitable grounds render its execution impossible or unjust due to facts and events transpiring after the judgment has become executory (Soco v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 753, 760 (1996).
2. There has been a change in the situation of the parties, which makes execution inequitable (Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., 431 Phil. 324, 333-334 [2002], citing Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 483, 493 (1998).
3. The judgment has been novated by the parties (Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 164 Phil. 381, 386 [1976]).
4. Injunctive relief is prayed for and granted (Rule 38, Sec. 5).
5. The five-year period to enforce the judgment has expired (Cunanan v. Court of Appeals, 134 Phil. 338 [1968]).
6. The judgment is incomplete or is conditional (Ignacio v. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 [1946]; Cu Unjieng v. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 380 [1940]).

OGCC as counsel for GOCCs

The designation of the OGCC as the legal counsel for GOCCs is set forth by statute, initially by Rep. Act No. 3838, then reiterated by the Administrative Code of 1987. Given that the designation is statutory in nature, there is no impediment for Congress to impose a different role for the OGCC with respect to particular GOCCs it may charter. Congress appears to have done so with respect to GSIS, designating the OGCC as a “legal adviser and consultant,” rather than as counsel to GSIS. (GSIS v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183905, April 16, 2009)

Writ of Possession in Expropriation

The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession. (MWCD v. J. King, G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009)

Reservation of Separate Civil Action in BP 22

Nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check. (Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009)

Warrant of Arrest

On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. (Revaldo v. People, G.R. No. 170589. April 16, 2009)

Protected Speech

A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and expression endangering national security. But this list is not, as some members of the Court would submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be stated without fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation. (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009)

Appointment to Civil Service

All told, we reiterate the long-standing rule that the mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. (Amores v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009)

Tax Laws

It is settled that tax laws are prospective in application, unless expressly provided to apply retroactively. (Provincial Assessor of Marinduque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170532, April 30, 2009)

Strict Adherence to Procedure

In Ginete vs. Court of Appeals, we specifically laid down the range of reasons which may provide justifications for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure and suspend the enforcement of procedural rules. Among such reasons x x x are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) counsel’s negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; and (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. (Estino v. People, G.R. Nos. 163957-58, April 7, 2009)

Credibility of Child Witness' Testimony

Indeed, as the defense asserts, a child witness’ testimony should normally be found credible due to his unlikely propensity to be dishonest. This Court, however, finds the credibility of accused-appellant’s nine-year old son, Reymel, to be doubtful. His testimony is necessarily suspect, as he is accused-appellant’s close relative. (People v. Capalad, G.R. No. 184174, April 7, 2009)

One Offense Only in Information

Although under Section 13 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an information must charge only one offense, the accused failed to file a motion to quash information and thus waived their right to be tried for only one crime under one information pursuant to Section 9 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased. (People v. Honor, G.R. No. 175945, April 7, 2009)

Order of Comelec Appealable to SC

Settled is the rule that it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc which, in accordance with Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, may be brought to this Court on certiorari. But this rule should not apply when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself, and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, as in this case. Further, the rule is not ironclad; it admits of exceptions as when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside, even if it were merely a Division action, is an absolute nullity. (Aguilar v. Comelec, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009)

MR elevated to Comelec En Banc

In Soriano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we emphasized the rule that a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a COMELEC division, except with regard to interlocutory orders, shall be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. (Aguilar v. Comelec, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009)

Fresh Period Rule

Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides). (Pates v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009)

Publication of Amended Application for Registration

Sec. 7 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for the publication of the application for registration and the schedule of the initial hearing. This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like ordinary administrative registration, are in rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence. Due publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim and identity of the property that will be surveyed. And any additional territory or change in the area of the claim cannot be included by amendment of the plan or application without new publication, otherwise the cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction over the additional or amended claim. But where the identity and area of the claimed property are not the subjects of amendment but other collateral matters, a new publication is not needed. (De Luzuriaga v. Republic, G.R. No. 168848, June 30, 2009)

Prescription and Laches

As has been consistently held, neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land registration case. In line with this doctrine of the inapplicability of prescription and laches on registration cases, the Court has ruled that “the failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land.” (De Luzuriaga v. Republic, G.R. No. 168848, June 30, 2009)

That the loans were obtained way back in 1991-1992 is of no moment, considering that administrative offenses do not prescribe. (Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7, 2009)

Employer Liability Outside Premises

The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is traveling for the employer, i.e. traveling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances. (Becmen v. Cuaresma, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, April 7, 2009 citing Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-26341, November 27, 1968)

Remand

Jurisprudence dictates that remand of a case to a lower court does not follow if, in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute based on the records before it. As a rule, remand is avoided in the following instances: (a) where the ends of justice would not be subserved by a remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial court has already received all the evidence presented by both parties, and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said evidence, to decide the case on its merits. In Lao v. People, the Supreme Court, in consideration of the years that it had taken for the controversy therein to reach it, concluded that remand of the case to a lower court was no longer the more expeditious and practical route to follow, and it then decided the said case based on the evidentiary record before it. (Poe v. Malayan, G.R. No. 156302, April 7, 2009)

Reinstatement

In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. Fourteen years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. (Perez v. PT&T, G.R. No. 152048, April 9, 2009)

Hearing in Dismissal Cases not Mandatory

His written explanation may also include a request that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary disputes or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure. (Perez v. PT&T, G.R. No. 152048, April 9, 2009)

Judicial Hierarchy of Courts

The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt.

The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the exercise of this Court of its primary jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner alleges that EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722 and in doing so, the Executive Department usurps the legislative powers of Congress. The alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to its importance to the public and in keeping with its duty to determine whether the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution. (Review Center v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009)

However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant petition. (Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, 1 December 2009)

However, on several occasions, this Court found compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v. Cajigal, the Court opted not to strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy, considered to be one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused (Churchille V. Mari and People of the Philippines Vs. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogo, Southern Leyte and PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres, G.R. No. 187728. September 12, 2011)

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention (United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. Vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107. January 31, 2012).

Retroactivity of Amended Information

The rule may well be that the amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the original information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment. (People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009)

No Separation Pay for Legal Dismissal

Given the finding of guilt and the penalty imposed, no basis exists to support and justify this award. No court, not even this Court, can make an award that is not based on law. Neither can this award be justified even if viewed as a discretionary financial assistance, since this kind of award can be imposed only where the cause for dismissal is not serious misconduct or a cause reflecting on the employee’s moral character. The dismissal we affirm is precisely for serious misconduct. The causes cited reflect as well on Salon’s moral character. Hence, we delete any award of separation pay/financial assistance that the appellate court decreed. (TIPTEO v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158703, June 26, 2009)

Suppression of Evidence

The adverse presumption of suppression of evidence does not, moreover, apply where the evidence suppressed is merely corroborative or cumulative in nature. (Ritualo v. People, G.R. No. 178337, June 25, 2009)

Admission by Silence

Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply. (Villanueva v. Balaguer, G.R. No. 180197, June 23, 2009)

Written Notice in Legal Redemption

Interpreting this provision, we have enumerated the requisites for the exercise of legal redemption, as follows: (1) there must be co-ownership; (2) one of the co-owners sold his right to a stranger; (3) the sale was made before the partition of the co-owned property; (4) the right of redemption must be exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of thirty days to be counted from the time he or they were notified in writing by the co-owner vendor; and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed the price of the sale. With respect to the written notice, the exception is when a co-owner has actual notice of the sale. (Calma v. Santos, G.R. No. 161027, June 22, 2009)

Appeal of Interlocutory Order

While the general rule proscribes the appeal of an interlocutory order, there are also recognized exceptions to that rule. Where special circumstances clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal, then the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed. This Court recognizes that, under certain situations, recourse to extraordinary legal remedies, such as a petition for certiorari, is considered proper to question the denial of a motion to quash (or any other interlocutory order) in the interest of a “more enlightened and substantial justice;” or to promote public welfare and public policy; or when the cases “have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;” or when the order was rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order: (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. (Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009)

Prospective Application of Law

“Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” The legislative intent as to the retroactive application of a law is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.

A well-settled exception to the rule on prospectivity is when the law in question is remedial in nature. The rationale underpinning the exception is that no person can claim any vested right in any particular remedy or mode of procedure for the enforcement of a right. (Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009)

Payment of Docket Fee

Among the grounds that pertinent jurisprudence has recognized as justifying the loosening up of the stringent requirement on payment of docket fees are: (1) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (2) good faith of the defaulting party by paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is frivolous and dilatory; (6) no unjust prejudice to the other party; and (7) importance of the issues involved. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. (Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009)

Presentation of Informant

It is well-settled that except when the petitioner vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the petitioner, or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. (Quinicot v. People, G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009)

Personal Notice in Extrajudicial Foreclosure

Thus, we restate: the general rule is that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary, and posting and publication will suffice. Sec. 3 of Act 3135 governing extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, as amended by Act 4118, requires only posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. The exception is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is additionally required to be given the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders the foreclosure proceedings null and void. (Global v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 184081, June 19, 2009)

Supervision over Corporations

Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that:

The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. (Koruga v. Arcenas, G.R. No. 168332, June 19, 2009)

Negligence of Counsel

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality. (Carino v. Espinoza, G.R. No. 166036, June 18, 2009)

Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client. We have, however, carved out exceptions to this rule; as where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; or where the application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so requires and relief ought to be accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence. (Multi-trans v. Oriental, G.R. No. 180817, June 23, 2009)

No Separation Pay to Resigned Employees

In Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, We held that as a general rule, separation pay need not be paid to an employee who voluntarily resigns. However, an employer who agrees to expend such benefit as an incident of the resignation should not be allowed to renege on the fulfillment of such commitment. ( "J" Marketing v. Taran, G.R. No. 163924, June 18, 2009)

Employee Benefits

Ordinarily, an employee would have no right to demand benefits that the employer was not obligated by law or contract to give. However, it is the jurisprudential rule that where there is an established employer practice of regularly, knowingly and voluntarily granting benefits to employees over a significant period of time, despite the lack of a legal or contractual obligation on the part of the employer to do so, the grant of such benefits ripens into a vested right of the employees and can no longer be unilaterally reduced or withdrawn by the employer. (Metrobank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 152928, June 18, 2009)