Intervention

[A]llowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing (310 Phil. 722 (1995)], the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.

In Collado v. Court of Appeals, this Court reiterated that exceptions to Section 2, Rule 12 could be made in the interest of substantial justice. (STRADCOR v. Radstock, G.R. No. 178158, 4 December 2009)

Reliance on Title Alone

In Sunshine Finance, the Court required, for the first time, investment and financing corporations to take the necessary precautions to ascertain if there were any flaws in the certificate of title and examine the condition of the property they were dealing with. Although the property involved was mortgaged to and, subsequently, purchased by therein petitioner several years before the said decision was promulgated, we note that the rule was immediately applied to that case.

Our herein assailed ruling expands the ruling in Sunshine Finance to cover realty corporations, which, because of the nature of their business, are, likewise, expected to exercise a higher standard of diligence in ascertaining the status of the property, not merely rely on what appears on the face of a certificate of title. In like manner, our ruling should be applied to the present case; otherwise, it would be reduced to “a mere academic exercise with the result that the doctrine laid down would be no more than a dictum, and would deprive the holding in the case of any force.” (Eagle Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 151424, July 31, 2009)

Issuance of Warrant of Arrest

In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles, the Court noted that the requirement to post bail is no longer necessary under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Further, in Martinez, Sr. v. Judge Paguio, the Court observed that under Republic Act No. 6036, bail is not generally required for violation of municipal or city ordinances, and for criminal offenses when the prescribed penalty is not higher than arresto mayor or fine of P2,000 or both. (Cervantes v. Pangilinan, A.M. MTJ-08-1709, July 31, 2009)

Necessity of Standing in Case

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome of the case. This is also the reason why this Court may investigate charges against lawyers regardless of complainant’s standing. (Camara v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6121, July 31, 2009)

Authority to Act for Corporation

The general rule remains that, in the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even its officers, can validly bind a corporation. If a corporation, however, consciously lets one of its officers, or any other agent, to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it will be estopped from denying such officer’s authority. (Westmont v. Inland, G.R. No. 123650, March 23, 2009)

Liability in Robbery with Homicide

When a homicide takes place by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether or not they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that they had endeavored to prevent the killing. (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 187152, July 22, 2009)

Effect of Sale on Easement

From the foregoing, it can be inferred that when the owner of two properties alienates one of them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates, entitlement to it continues, unless there is a contrary agreement, or the indication that the easement exists is removed before the execution of the deed. (PMO v. Legaspi Towers, G.R. No. 147957, July 22, 2009)

Non-Compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165

A close examination of the IRR of RA 9165 readily reveals that the custodial chain rule admits of exceptions. Thus, contrary to the brazen assertions of Cortez, the prescriptions of the IRR’s Sec. 21 need not be followed with pedantic rigor as a condition sine qua non for a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not, by itself, render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” (People vs. Cortez, G.R. No. 183819, July 23, 2009)

Need for Consent of Spouse in Sale of Conjugal Property under the Civil Code

So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. (De Leon v. de Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009)

Effect of Appeal to Other Accused

Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. (People v. Olivo, G.R. No. 177768, July 27, 2009)

Absence in Pre-trial

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions, non-appearance by the plaintiff in the pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the action. However, every rule is not without an exception. In fact, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides that the non-appearance of a party may be excused if a valid cause is shown therefor. (Anson v. Pacific Banking, G.R. No. 179999, March 17, 2009)

Mandamus to Compel Action Only

It is correct, as averred in the comment that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority (Kant Kwong vs. PCGG, 156 SCRA 222, 232 [1987]).

Here, the Office of the Ombudsman, due to its failure to resolve the criminal charges against petitioner for more than six years, has transgressed on the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him, as well as the Ombudsman's own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. For all these past 6 years, petitioner has remained under a cloud, and since his retirement in September 1994, he has been deprived of the fruits of his retirement after serving the government for over 42 years all because of the inaction of respondent Ombudsman. If we wait any longer, it may be too late for petitioner to receive his retirement benefits, not to speak of clearing his name. This is a case of plain injustice which calls for the issuance of the writ prayed for. (Angchangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728. February 13, 1997)

No MR Against Comelec En Banc Resolution

The filing of his Motion for Reconsideration is of no moment. Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure categorically prohibits a motion to reconsider a resolution of the COMELEC en banc except in cases involving election offenses. (Valino v. Vergara, G.R. No. 180492, March 13, 2009)

No Determination of Heirship in Ordinary Civil Action

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs.

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. (Heirs of Gabatan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009)

Review of Errors

The Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. (Heirs of Gabatan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009)

Corporate Authority to Mortgage

A private corporation, by way of exceptions, may give a third party mortgage:

1. When the mortgage of corporate assets/properties shall be done in the furtherance of the interest of the corporation and in the usual and regular course of its business; and
2. To secure the debt of a subsidiary. (Zomer v. IEB, G.R. No. 150694, March 13, 2009)

Effectivity of Contract

Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. (Unisource v. Chung, G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009)

Acquittal Not Extinguish Civil Liability

Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009)

Authority to Act for Corporation

In People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that under Section 23, the power and the responsibility to decide whether the corporation should enter into a contract that will bind the corporation are lodged in the board of directors, subject to the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or relevant provisions of law. However, just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts for and on his behalf, the board of directors may validly delegate some of its functions and powers to officers, committees or agents. The authority of such individuals to bind the corporation is generally derived from law, corporate by-laws or authorization from the board, either expressly or impliedly by habit, custom or acquiescence in the general course of business. (Cebu v. Tsukahara, G.R. No. 159624, July 17, 2009)

Relief without Application

In Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison, we held that the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally. The petition for the writ is required to be verified but the defect in form is not fatal. Indeed, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, this Court declared that it is the duty of a court to issue the writ if there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor. (Fletcher v. Director of Bureau of Corrections, UDK-14071, July 17, 2009)

Collegial Body Must Act through Members

We also see no irregularity in the fact that the Order dated August 1, 2007 was signed only by the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division. He acted within the authority vested in him by Section 6, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. (Panlilio v. Comelec, G.R. No. 181478. July 15, 2009)

Review of DOJ Resolution

Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. (Aduan v. Chong, G.R. No. 172796. July 13, 2009)

Visitorial and Enforcement Power of DOLE

This notwithstanding, the power of the Regional Director to hear and decide the monetary claims of employees is not absolute. The last sentence of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the “exception clause,” provides an instance when the Regional Director or his representatives may be divested of jurisdiction over a labor standards case.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, the so-called “exception clause” has the following elements, all of which must concur:

1. that the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon;
2. that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and
3. that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. (Meteoro v. Creative Creatures, G.R. No. 171275, July 13, 2009)

Judgment in Ejectment Binding only on Parties

A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam. x x x Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. However, this rule admits of the exception, such that even a non-party may be bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant. (Salandanan v. Mendez, G.R. No. 160280, March 13, 2009)

Indefeasibility of Title

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership does not apply where the very certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin. (GAUF v. RTC, G.R. No. 139672, March 4, 2009)

Backwages for Illegal Dismissal

He never bothered to redeem his license at the soonest possible time when there was no showing that he was unlawfully prevented by respondent from doing so. Thus, petitioner should not be paid for the time he was not working. The Court has held that where the failure of employees to work was not due to the employer's fault, the burden of economic loss suffered by the employees should not be shifted to the employer. Each party must bear his own loss. It would be unfair to allow petitioner to recover something he has not earned and could not have earned, since he could not discharge his work as a driver without his driver's license. Respondent should be exempted from the burden of paying backwages.

The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or management and employee, of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining employees' wages. If there is no work performed by the employee, there can be no wage or pay -- unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed, or otherwise illegally prevented from working, a situation which we find is not present in the instant case.

Conjugal Partnership Not Liable for Personal Obligation

To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. (Buado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009)

Execution

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, viz: (a).where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision’s ratio decidendi; and (b).where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision. (Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 183278. April 24, 2009)

Motion Rule

For the most part, the Comelec was well within its authority to order a re-hearing, it having the inherent power to amend or control its processes and orders before these become final and executory. It can even proceed to issue an order motu proprio to reconsider, recall or set aside an earlier resolution which is still under its control. (Marcoleta v. Comelec, G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009)

Hearsay Rule

The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. The witness who testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same, as this is a matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is to prove either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof. (People v. Malibiran, G.R. No. 178301, April 24, 2009)

Dismissal of Appeal for Failure to File Brief

Section 8 is clear — the Court of Appeals may, motu proprio and with notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio. (Polintan v. People, G.R. No. 161827)

Dismissal with Consent No Double Jeopardy

As a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. (Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009)

Weight Given to Factual Findings of Trial Court

The rule on the weight to be given to the findings of the trial court does not unqualifiedly apply, when the judge who rendered the decision did not hear the principal evidence of the prosecution. For in such, case, his evaluation of the evidence is based on the transcript of stenographic notes, which also forms the basis for the Court of Appeals to review the trial court’s decision and render its own decision. (People v. Cawaling, G.R. No. 157147, April 17, 2009)

Hearsay Rule

It is a hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the witness stand. Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of Anita appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. (Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009)

Dismissal of Employee

We agree with both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that Atty. Garcia’s ouster as Vice-President, who is a corporate officer of ETPI, partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate controversy, jurisdiction over which is vested in the SEC (now the RTC). The Labor Arbiter thus erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case filed by Atty. Garcia, because he had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. (Garcia v. ETPI, G.R. No. 173115, April 16, 2009)

Person Liable for Violation of Anti-Graft Law

Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. However, if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which is “to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.” (Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 16, 2009)

Demolition

If under Rep. Act No. 7279, demolition and eviction are allowed when individuals have been identified as professional squatters and squatting syndicates or when they occupy danger areas and other public places, and under P.D. No. 1096, they construct dangerous and ruinous buildings or structures, then with more reason the SPFMPCI members should be summarily evicted and their structures and dwellings demolished. The parcel of land involved in this case is a security zone whose operations must be protected from any form of disruption. It must be protected from all types of squatters, including the SPFMPCI members, who might create danger to a very important national telecommunications facility. (Republic v. Mijares, G.R. No. 1706-15-16, July 9, 2009)

No Need to Appeal Decision of Secretary to OP

As a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

Furthermore, DAR-AO No. 7, s. 1997 requires an appeal (of the denial of application of conversion) to the OP. It was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy contemplated by Section 1 of Rule 65.

Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an administrative official should first appeal to the higher administrative authority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case, the complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action. (Manubay v. Garilao, G.R. No. 140717, April 16, 2009)

Practice or Custom

A practice or custom is, as a general rule, not a source of a legally demandable or enforceable right. Indeed, in labor cases, benefits which were voluntarily given by the employer, and which have ripened into company practice, are considered as rights that cannot be diminished by the employer. Nevertheless, even in such cases, the source of the employees’ right is not custom, but ultimately, the law, since Article 100 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits elimination or diminution of benefits. (Makati Stock Exchange v. Campos, G.R. No. 138814, April 16, 2009)

Void Contract

The general rule that the direct result of a previous void contract cannot be valid will not apply in this case as it will directly contravene the Torrens system of registration. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, this Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. (Rabaja vs. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, G.R. No. 177181, July 7, 2009)

Attorney's Fees Chargeable to Union Funds

Hence, the general rule is that attorney’s fees, negotiation fees, and other similar charges may only be collected from union funds, not from the amounts that pertain to individual union members. As an exception to the general rule, special assessments or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon or checked off from any amount due an employee for as long as there is proper authorization by the employee. (Marino v. Gamilla, G.R. No. 149763, July 7, 2009)

Authority to Use Government Vehicle

The use of government motor vehicles by the bureaus and offices enumerated under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 733 for the purpose herein indicated shall be authorized only through the issuance of each trip ticket, duly signed by the Chief or Administrative Officer of the bureau, office or entity concerned….

Except in emergency cases, under no circumstance should government motor vehicles be used without the corresponding trip ticket having been duly issued by the official designated for the purpose. In case of use of said vehicles without such trip tickets, the official to whom the vehicle is assigned, his driver and other passengers shall be personally liable for the unauthorized use thereof. (Re: Unauthorized Disposal of Unnecessary and Scrap Materials in the Supreme Court Baguio Compound, A.M. No. 2007-17-SC, July 7, 2009)

Separate Civil Action

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. (Cheng v. G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009)

Execution of Final Judgment

Execution of a final judgment or order may be stayed or precluded under any of the following conditions:

1. Equitable grounds render its execution impossible or unjust due to facts and events transpiring after the judgment has become executory (Soco v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 753, 760 (1996).
2. There has been a change in the situation of the parties, which makes execution inequitable (Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., 431 Phil. 324, 333-334 [2002], citing Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 483, 493 (1998).
3. The judgment has been novated by the parties (Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 164 Phil. 381, 386 [1976]).
4. Injunctive relief is prayed for and granted (Rule 38, Sec. 5).
5. The five-year period to enforce the judgment has expired (Cunanan v. Court of Appeals, 134 Phil. 338 [1968]).
6. The judgment is incomplete or is conditional (Ignacio v. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 [1946]; Cu Unjieng v. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 380 [1940]).

OGCC as counsel for GOCCs

The designation of the OGCC as the legal counsel for GOCCs is set forth by statute, initially by Rep. Act No. 3838, then reiterated by the Administrative Code of 1987. Given that the designation is statutory in nature, there is no impediment for Congress to impose a different role for the OGCC with respect to particular GOCCs it may charter. Congress appears to have done so with respect to GSIS, designating the OGCC as a “legal adviser and consultant,” rather than as counsel to GSIS. (GSIS v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183905, April 16, 2009)

Writ of Possession in Expropriation

The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession. (MWCD v. J. King, G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009)

Reservation of Separate Civil Action in BP 22

Nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil action against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check. (Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009)

Warrant of Arrest

On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. (Revaldo v. People, G.R. No. 170589. April 16, 2009)

Protected Speech

A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and expression endangering national security. But this list is not, as some members of the Court would submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be stated without fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation. (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009)

Appointment to Civil Service

All told, we reiterate the long-standing rule that the mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. (Amores v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009)

Tax Laws

It is settled that tax laws are prospective in application, unless expressly provided to apply retroactively. (Provincial Assessor of Marinduque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170532, April 30, 2009)

Strict Adherence to Procedure

In Ginete vs. Court of Appeals, we specifically laid down the range of reasons which may provide justifications for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure and suspend the enforcement of procedural rules. Among such reasons x x x are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) counsel’s negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; and (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. (Estino v. People, G.R. Nos. 163957-58, April 7, 2009)

Credibility of Child Witness' Testimony

Indeed, as the defense asserts, a child witness’ testimony should normally be found credible due to his unlikely propensity to be dishonest. This Court, however, finds the credibility of accused-appellant’s nine-year old son, Reymel, to be doubtful. His testimony is necessarily suspect, as he is accused-appellant’s close relative. (People v. Capalad, G.R. No. 184174, April 7, 2009)

One Offense Only in Information

Although under Section 13 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an information must charge only one offense, the accused failed to file a motion to quash information and thus waived their right to be tried for only one crime under one information pursuant to Section 9 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased. (People v. Honor, G.R. No. 175945, April 7, 2009)

Order of Comelec Appealable to SC

Settled is the rule that it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc which, in accordance with Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, may be brought to this Court on certiorari. But this rule should not apply when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself, and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, as in this case. Further, the rule is not ironclad; it admits of exceptions as when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside, even if it were merely a Division action, is an absolute nullity. (Aguilar v. Comelec, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009)

MR elevated to Comelec En Banc

In Soriano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, we emphasized the rule that a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a COMELEC division, except with regard to interlocutory orders, shall be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. (Aguilar v. Comelec, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009)

Fresh Period Rule

Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides). (Pates v. Comelec, G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009)

Publication of Amended Application for Registration

Sec. 7 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for the publication of the application for registration and the schedule of the initial hearing. This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like ordinary administrative registration, are in rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence. Due publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim and identity of the property that will be surveyed. And any additional territory or change in the area of the claim cannot be included by amendment of the plan or application without new publication, otherwise the cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction over the additional or amended claim. But where the identity and area of the claimed property are not the subjects of amendment but other collateral matters, a new publication is not needed. (De Luzuriaga v. Republic, G.R. No. 168848, June 30, 2009)

Prescription and Laches

As has been consistently held, neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land registration case. In line with this doctrine of the inapplicability of prescription and laches on registration cases, the Court has ruled that “the failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land.” (De Luzuriaga v. Republic, G.R. No. 168848, June 30, 2009)

That the loans were obtained way back in 1991-1992 is of no moment, considering that administrative offenses do not prescribe. (Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7, 2009)

Employer Liability Outside Premises

The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is traveling for the employer, i.e. traveling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances. (Becmen v. Cuaresma, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, April 7, 2009 citing Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-26341, November 27, 1968)

Remand

Jurisprudence dictates that remand of a case to a lower court does not follow if, in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute based on the records before it. As a rule, remand is avoided in the following instances: (a) where the ends of justice would not be subserved by a remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial court has already received all the evidence presented by both parties, and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said evidence, to decide the case on its merits. In Lao v. People, the Supreme Court, in consideration of the years that it had taken for the controversy therein to reach it, concluded that remand of the case to a lower court was no longer the more expeditious and practical route to follow, and it then decided the said case based on the evidentiary record before it. (Poe v. Malayan, G.R. No. 156302, April 7, 2009)

Reinstatement

In this case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. Fourteen years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical purpose. (Perez v. PT&T, G.R. No. 152048, April 9, 2009)

Hearing in Dismissal Cases not Mandatory

His written explanation may also include a request that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary disputes or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure. (Perez v. PT&T, G.R. No. 152048, April 9, 2009)

Judicial Hierarchy of Courts

The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt.

The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the exercise of this Court of its primary jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner alleges that EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722 and in doing so, the Executive Department usurps the legislative powers of Congress. The alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an action due to its importance to the public and in keeping with its duty to determine whether the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution. (Review Center v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009)

However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant petition. (Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, 1 December 2009)

However, on several occasions, this Court found compelling reasons to relax the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v. Cajigal, the Court opted not to strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy, considered to be one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused (Churchille V. Mari and People of the Philippines Vs. Hon. Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogo, Southern Leyte and PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres, G.R. No. 187728. September 12, 2011)

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention (United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. Vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107. January 31, 2012).

Retroactivity of Amended Information

The rule may well be that the amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the original information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment. (People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009)

No Separation Pay for Legal Dismissal

Given the finding of guilt and the penalty imposed, no basis exists to support and justify this award. No court, not even this Court, can make an award that is not based on law. Neither can this award be justified even if viewed as a discretionary financial assistance, since this kind of award can be imposed only where the cause for dismissal is not serious misconduct or a cause reflecting on the employee’s moral character. The dismissal we affirm is precisely for serious misconduct. The causes cited reflect as well on Salon’s moral character. Hence, we delete any award of separation pay/financial assistance that the appellate court decreed. (TIPTEO v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158703, June 26, 2009)

Suppression of Evidence

The adverse presumption of suppression of evidence does not, moreover, apply where the evidence suppressed is merely corroborative or cumulative in nature. (Ritualo v. People, G.R. No. 178337, June 25, 2009)

Admission by Silence

Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply. (Villanueva v. Balaguer, G.R. No. 180197, June 23, 2009)

Written Notice in Legal Redemption

Interpreting this provision, we have enumerated the requisites for the exercise of legal redemption, as follows: (1) there must be co-ownership; (2) one of the co-owners sold his right to a stranger; (3) the sale was made before the partition of the co-owned property; (4) the right of redemption must be exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of thirty days to be counted from the time he or they were notified in writing by the co-owner vendor; and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed the price of the sale. With respect to the written notice, the exception is when a co-owner has actual notice of the sale. (Calma v. Santos, G.R. No. 161027, June 22, 2009)

Appeal of Interlocutory Order

While the general rule proscribes the appeal of an interlocutory order, there are also recognized exceptions to that rule. Where special circumstances clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal, then the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed. This Court recognizes that, under certain situations, recourse to extraordinary legal remedies, such as a petition for certiorari, is considered proper to question the denial of a motion to quash (or any other interlocutory order) in the interest of a “more enlightened and substantial justice;” or to promote public welfare and public policy; or when the cases “have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;” or when the order was rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order: (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. (Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009)

Prospective Application of Law

“Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” The legislative intent as to the retroactive application of a law is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.

A well-settled exception to the rule on prospectivity is when the law in question is remedial in nature. The rationale underpinning the exception is that no person can claim any vested right in any particular remedy or mode of procedure for the enforcement of a right. (Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009)

Payment of Docket Fee

Among the grounds that pertinent jurisprudence has recognized as justifying the loosening up of the stringent requirement on payment of docket fees are: (1) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (2) good faith of the defaulting party by paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is frivolous and dilatory; (6) no unjust prejudice to the other party; and (7) importance of the issues involved. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. (Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009)

Presentation of Informant

It is well-settled that except when the petitioner vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the petitioner, or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. (Quinicot v. People, G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009)

Personal Notice in Extrajudicial Foreclosure

Thus, we restate: the general rule is that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary, and posting and publication will suffice. Sec. 3 of Act 3135 governing extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, as amended by Act 4118, requires only posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. The exception is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is additionally required to be given the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders the foreclosure proceedings null and void. (Global v. Metrobank, G.R. No. 184081, June 19, 2009)

Supervision over Corporations

Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that:

The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. (Koruga v. Arcenas, G.R. No. 168332, June 19, 2009)

Negligence of Counsel

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality. (Carino v. Espinoza, G.R. No. 166036, June 18, 2009)

Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client. We have, however, carved out exceptions to this rule; as where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; or where the application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so requires and relief ought to be accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence. (Multi-trans v. Oriental, G.R. No. 180817, June 23, 2009)

No Separation Pay to Resigned Employees

In Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, We held that as a general rule, separation pay need not be paid to an employee who voluntarily resigns. However, an employer who agrees to expend such benefit as an incident of the resignation should not be allowed to renege on the fulfillment of such commitment. ( "J" Marketing v. Taran, G.R. No. 163924, June 18, 2009)

Employee Benefits

Ordinarily, an employee would have no right to demand benefits that the employer was not obligated by law or contract to give. However, it is the jurisprudential rule that where there is an established employer practice of regularly, knowingly and voluntarily granting benefits to employees over a significant period of time, despite the lack of a legal or contractual obligation on the part of the employer to do so, the grant of such benefits ripens into a vested right of the employees and can no longer be unilaterally reduced or withdrawn by the employer. (Metrobank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 152928, June 18, 2009)

Corporate Power to Sue

The general rule is that where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. Nonetheless, an individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in interest. (Yu v. Yukayguan, G.R. No. 177549, June 18, 2009)

Reglementary Period

As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby. (Guasch v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 176015, June 16, 2009)

Incomplete Testimony

Petitioner contends that because her direct examination has not been completed and as she has not been cross-examined, her testimony has become useless. Apparently, petitioner is alluding to the rule that oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party; until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. The rule will not apply to the instant case.

Private respondent, who was present in court during the August 20, 2003 hearing and did not register any objection to the trial court's order nor move to strike out petitioner's testimony from the records, is deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine petitioner. Thus, petitioner's testimony is not rendered worthless. The waiver will not expunge the testimony of petitioner off the records. The trial court will still weigh the evidence presented by petitioner vis-à-vis that of private respondent's. (De Castro v. De Castro, G.R. No. 172198, June 16, 2009)

Res Judicata

There can be no res judicata where the previous order in question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication. (People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009)

Effect of Forum Shopping

Ordinarily, a dismissal on the ground of forum shopping dispenses with the need to address the other issues raised in the case. But this rule is not hard-and-fast, more so since the dismissal occasioned by breach of the anti-forum shopping rule does not permeate the merits of the case. Where such technical dismissal would otherwise lead to an inequitable result, the appropriate recourse is to resolve the issue concerned on its merit or resort to the principles of equity. After all, rules of procedure should not operate at all times in such a rigid way that would override the ends of substantial justice. Specifically, the rule on forum shopping was cobbled to foster and accelerate the orderly administration of justice and, therefore, should not be interpreted literally in every instance. (Tagaro v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173931, April 2, 2009)

State Immunity from Estoppel

Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, we have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use. One would assume that if respondents were correct, they would have adduced the factual or legal basis for their contention, such as the local government’s land use plan or zoning ordinance that would indicate that the property was not commercial. Respondents did not do so, and the absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong. (Newsounds v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009)

Appeal of Pure Question of Law

Rule 43 provides for an instance where an appellate review solely on a question of law may be sought in the CA instead of the Supreme Court. (Santos v. Committee on Claims Settlement, G.R. No. 158071, April 2, 2009)

Period to File Disqualification Cases before HRET

However, the said ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification cases based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding. (Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178831-32, April 1, 2009)

Joint Adoption by Spouses

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Lim, G.R. No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009)

Immutability of Final Judgments

Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment. (Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156687-88, May 21, 2009)

It is true that notwithstanding the principle of immutability of final judgments, equity still accords some recourse to a party adversely affected by a final and executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to annul the judgment based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, or the remedy of a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. He may also have a competent court stay the execution or prevent the enforcement of a final judgment when facts and circumstances that render execution inequitable or unjust meanwhile transpire; or when a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief (Angelina Pahila-Garrido Vs. Elisa M. Tortogo, et al., G.R. No. 156358. August 17, 2011).

Privileged Communication

We note that the publications or articles in question are neither private communications nor true reports of official proceedings without any comments or remarks. However, this does not necessarily mean that the questioned articles are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. (Villanueva v. PDI, G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009)

Certiorari even if Appeal Available

It must be remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. The Court has not too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations would warrant such a recourse. Moreover, the Court allowed a Rule 65 petition, despite the availability of plain, speedy or adequate remedy, in view of the importance of the issues raised therein. The rules were also relaxed by the Court after considering the public interest involved in the case; when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; when the broader interest of justice so requires; when the writs issued are null and void; or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. (People's Broadcasting v. Secretary of DOLE, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)

Cash or Surety Bond for Perfecting an Appeal

Thus, in some cases, the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards had been relaxed, such as when (i) there was substantial compliance with the Rules; (ii) the surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious ground to reduce the bond; (iii) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits; or (iv) the appellants, at the very least exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.

The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently affirmed. The Deed of Assignment in the instant case, like a cash or surety bond, serves the same purpose. First, the Deed of Assignment constitutes not just a partial amount, but rather the entire award in the appealed Order. Second, it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount is under the full control of the bank, and not of petitioner, and is in fact payable to the DOLE Regional Office, to be withdrawn by the same office after it had issued a writ of execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of Assignment in tandem with the Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. Third, the Court finds that the execution of the Deed of Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made in good faith, and constituted clear manifestation of petitioner’s willingness to pay the judgment amount. (People's Broadcasting v. Secretary of DOLE, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009)

Presumption of Regularity

The courts below heavily relied on the testimony of PO3 Tougan and in the same breadth, banked on the presumption of regularity. In People v. Garcia, we said that the presumption only arises in the absence of contrary details in the case that raise doubt on the regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedures prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption. (People v. Partoza, G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009)

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties likewise stands in this case. Said presumption was not overcome, as there was no evidence showing that the two police officers were impelled by improper motive. (Quinicot v. People, G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009)

Obligation to Issue Ex Parte Writ of Possession

The obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. (DBP v. PNA, G.R. No. 175728, May 8, 2009)

Relationship between Bank and Depositor

Generally, the relationship between a credit card provider and its card holders is that of creditor-debtor, with the card company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the card holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the creditor. This relationship already takes exception to the general rule that as between a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the depositor is considered as the creditor. (Pantaleon v. American Express, G.R. No. 174269, May 8, 2009)

Constructive Delivery

However, the execution of a public instrument only gives rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment. It is necessary that the vendor shall have control over the thing sold that, at the moment of sale, its material delivery could have been made. Thus, a person who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a public instrument. (APT v. T. J. Enterprises, G.R. No. 167195, May 8, 2009)

Right of Contingent Creditor to Access Records of Intestate Proceedings

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all “interested parties” the petitioners as “interested parties” will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners. (Hilado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009)

Five-Year Period to Execute thru Motion

Respondent’s motion for execution was filed only on June 14, 2005, or six years and nine months from entry of judgment. It was clearly beyond the five-year period but within the ten-year prescriptive period. We have, at various occasions, allowed a mere motion for execution even if filed beyond the five-year period, for reasons of equity. We apply the same liberality in this case in view of the peculiar situation in this case. (PVB v. Solid Homes, G.R. No. 170126, June 9, 2009)

Effect of Certiorari on Prescriptive Period

Despite being an original certiorari proceeding, G.R. No. 138993 tolled the running of the prescriptive period. An analysis of its peculiar nature justifies taking it out of the ambit of the rule that certiorari proceedings do not toll the running of the prescriptive period. (PVB v. Solid Homes, G.R. No. 170126, June 9, 2009)

Habitual and Gross Negligence as Ground for Dismissal

Gross negligence is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

Although Mateo’s infraction was not habitual, we must take into account the substantial amount lost. In this case, LBC lost a motorcycle with a book value of P46,000 which by any means could not be considered a trivial amount. Mateo was entrusted with a great responsibility to take care of and protect company property and his gross negligence should not allow him to walk away from that incident as if nothing happened and, worse, to be rewarded with backwages to boot. (LBC v. Mateo, G.R. No. 168215, June 9, 2009)

Motion for Extension to File Motion for Reconsideration

Thus, the general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed.

This rule, however, is not absolute and admits of exceptions based on a liberal reading of the rule.

In opting for the liberal application of the rules in the interest of equity and justice, the Court held that we “cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all.”

We feel, too, that the petitioner can neither be faulted nor punished for the NPO’s act of releasing the April 3, 1995 issue early; it was a matter wholly outside the petitioner’s control given that this is a decision wholly for NPO to make. (Imperial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158093, June 5, 2009)

Change of Theory on Appeal

The People contends that accused-appellant should not be allowed to change his theory on appeal. We do not agree. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole action for review on any question including those not raised by the parties (People vs. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996); People vs. Godines, 196 SCRA 765 [1991]; People vs. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 [1993]; see also Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]). The reason for this rule is that every circumstance in favor of the accused should be considered (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). (People v. Yam-Id, G.R. No. 126116, June 21, 1999).

As a rule, a change of theory cannot be allowed. However, when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the Court may give due course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein (Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009).

Grounds for Termination of Employment

Essentially, the Labor Code of the Philippines has several provisions under which an employee may be validly terminated, namely: (1) just causes under Article 282; (2) authorized causes under Article 283; (3) termination due to disease under Article 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Article 285. While the said provisions did not mention as ground the enforcement of the Union Security Clause in the CBA, the dismissal from employment based on the same is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. (Inguillo v. First Phil. Scales, G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009)

In Del Monte Philippines, the stipulations in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since a CBA is the law between the company and the Union, and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor.

Negligence of Counsel

It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.

In People of the Philippines and Bricio Ygana v. Rafael Bitanga, an exception to the foregoing rule is enunciated, and that is when the negligence of counsel had been so egregious that it prejudiced his client's interest and denied him his day in court. For this exception to apply, however, the gross negligence of counsel should not be accompanied by his client's own negligence or malice. Clients have the duty to be vigilant of their interests by keeping themselves up to date on the status of their case. (Pascual v. People, G.R. No. 162286, June 5, 2009)

It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client.  A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. The only exception would be, where the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law. In this case, there was no such deprivation of due process. Respondent was able to fully present and argue her case before the Labor Arbiter.  She was accorded the opportunity to be heard.  Her failure to appeal the Labor Arbiter's Decision cannot, therefore, be deemed as a deprivation of her right to due process (Building Care Corporation / Leopard Security & Investigation Agency and/or Ruperto Protacio Vs. Myrna Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357. December 5, 2012).

In Pari Delicto

Thus, we declared that even assuming both parties were guilty of the violation, it does not always follow that both parties, being in pari delicto, should be left where they are. We recognized as an exception a situation when courts must interfere and grant relief to one of the parties because public policy requires their intervention, even if it will result in a benefit derived by a plaintiff who is in equal guilt with defendant. (Villegas v. Rural Bank of Tanjay, G.R. No. 161407, June 5, 2009)

Release of Surety in Case of Change in Contract

Indeed, a surety is released from its obligation when there is a material alteration of the principal contract in connection with which the bond is given, such as a change which imposes a new obligation on the promising party, or which takes away some obligation already imposed, or one which changes the legal effect of the original contract and not merely its form. However, a surety is not released by a change in the contract, which does not have the effect of making its obligation more onerous. (Stronghold v. Tokyu, G.R. No. 158820-21, June 5, 2009)

Who May Claim Insurance Proceeds

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.

Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured. (Maramag v. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009)

Hypothetical Admission

The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.

However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if:

1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2. such allegations are legally impossible;
3. the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case. (Maramag v. Maramag, G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009)

Waiver of Claim if not in Answer

As we explained in Banco de Oro Universal Bank v. CA, a party is not barred from setting up a claim even after the filing of the answer if the claim did not exist or had not matured at the time said party filed its answer. (TRB v. Cuison, G.R. No. 174286, June 5, 2009)

Appeal from Judgment of Acquittal

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense. (People v. de Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009)

The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication(Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. Vs. Sally Go Bangayan/Resally De Asis Delfin Vs. Sally Go Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777/G.R. No. 172792. October 19, 2011).